After Bombs, It’s Smart Sanctions
THE signing of guidelines to stop hostilities in Mindanao between the Philippine Government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and unity agreement between the latter and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) are indications that true Muslims are neither promoters nor propagators of violence.
The agreement “to ease the war of bullets and of words, and for the parties to follow the road to peace through earnest and principled negotiations” is also a manifestation of the huge benefits of “constructive engagement”, or as succinctly put by President Gloria Arroyo, “subtle engagement” of the parties involved.
The drafting of Myanmar into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations a few years ago is yet another example of “constructive engagement”.
Rather than threatening the nation with boycott and other punitive measures, Asean decided to extend a friendly hand. The choice of leadership of the country is totally left to the people of Myanmar.
However, the same cannot be said of the United Nations approach in dealing with intra-nation conflicts. A favourite method employed, although sometimes somewhat arbitrarily, is sanction.
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter gives the 15-member Security Council the power to determine the existence of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” through the actions of member countries.
Substantive decisions with nine “yes” votes and no veto from a permanent member — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — are required to adopt sanction, which must then be adhered to by all UN members.
The prevalence of intra-state conflict has been accompanied by a notable increase in the willingness on the part of the UN Security Council to intervene, even in what is sometimes perceived as “domestic affairs” of a nation.
Concomitantly, the scope of imposing sanction has been widened to include efforts to protect personal freedom, democracy and human rights, as envisaged by the members of the Security Council.
In view of the increasing number of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in the post-Cold War period, scholars have questioned the merits and demerits of such strategy.
Is the mechanism to adopt sanctions by the UN Security Council fair? Are sanctions effective? Have they contributed to a greater degree of international peace and security? What are the alternatives to sanctions? Despite their apparent virtues in terms of legitimacy and universality, questionable achievements and adverse consequences of sanctions imposed by the Security Council have been widely reported.
First, it is now recognised that there are major flaws in the mechanics of proposing and adopting sanctions. Political bargaining is needed to secure passage of a resolution. A compromise is almost inevitable.
There is also lack of transparency due to exclusionary behaviour, with the sanctions committee responsible for granting or denying exemptions from sanctions operating in camera.
There is also growing resentment among UN members at large of Security Council dominance by the five core members with the “veto” power.
The veto power introduces rigidities by operating to obstruct the easing of sanctions when this would be an appropriate response to changed circumstances.
Second, dissatisfaction among the general membership is reinforced by the Security Council’s failure to address the issue of burden-sharing to mitigate the adverse effects of sanctions on non-target States, particularly those in the neighbourhood of the target nation or having close economic ties with it.
Third, comprehensive economic sanctions are seen to exert their main impact on the civilian population who are unable to protect themselves.
Little or no influence can be detected on the formulation and implementation of national policies the sanctions are intended to change in the first place. A pertinent example of this is the sanction against Iraq.
The sanction was the Security Council’s incredibly prompt response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on Aug 2, 1990. Iraq’s act of external aggression followed by the purported annexation, offered a classic example of a “breach of peace”.
Today, a comprehensive set of economic sanctions imposed on Iraq on Aug 6, 1990 remains, pending the fulfilment of conditions, particularly the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction that has not yet been accomplished to the satisfaction of the US and UK.
The bombing of Iraq during the Gulf War targeted infrastructure, with drastic effects on public health. One of the many results was a lack of water free of infections, especially from diarrhoea, cholera and other infectious diseases.
Let’s consider some indicators on the quality of life of Iraqis before and during the imposition of the sanction.
Infant mortality rate per thousand soared from 65 in 1990 to 101 in 1998, with excess mortality of close to a million children, exacerbated no doubt by severe malnutrition as a result of the UN embargo.
Crude birth rate per thousand persons decreased from 42 in 1990 to 32 in 1999, while crude death rate per thousand persons in the same period increased from eight to 10.
Average life expectancy at birth was shortened from 63 years in 1990 to 59 years in 1998. Women can now expect to live up to 60, while men can on average, reach only 58 years of age.
Total cereal production in metric tonnes eased from 3,457,000 in 1990 to 1,944,000 in 1998. Cereal production in kilogrammes per person went down from 191.2 to 73.2 in the same period.
Consequently, the average daily calorie intake per person slumped from 2,850 before sanction to 2,252 during sanction.
Adult literacy rate decreased from 89 per cent in 1985 to 58 per cent in 1998. The number of hospital beds per 100,000 people went down from 17,272 in 1990 to 13,985 in 1997.
Thus, sanctions that are supposed to contribute to international peace and security have actually impoverished innocent civilians, with particularly damaging and irreversible effects on children and the elderly.
In the hope of avoiding bad media publicity and tightening the screw on Iraq, “smart” sanctions have been proposed by a couple of the UN Security Council permanent members.
Smart sanctions are aimed at banning import of military equipment, regulating the sale of Iraq’s oil, limiting the travel of state leaders and monitoring Iraq’s external savings, while at the same time conjuring up a positive image of the sanctions in relation to their effects on the civilian population.
But will it work? We are all familiar with the so-called “smart bombs” used to destroy strategic installations in Iraq. We have also heard about the extent to civilian casualty inflicted by these “smart bombs”.
To those flexing their political and military muscles, bombs and sanctions may be deemed to be “smart”, but to the innocent victims, these are not only the “dumbest” but surely the most inhumane form of punishment.
Hence, alternatives to economic sanctions are receiving serious attention from scholars and practitioners. One possible way is to attempt constructive engagement, a strategy proven to be highly viable time and again.