The relationship between religion and human rights (what I personally termed ‘human-rightism’) is complicated and likely to remain controversial. To foster a better understanding between them, IKIM took the initiative to organize the seminar ‘Religion and Human Rights: Towards a Better Understanding’ in June.
Fifteen papers were deliberated, including a keynote address from Mashood A. Baderin, Professor of Law and Head of the School of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.
I feel obliged to share some of the points raised by Prof. Mashood. He specializes in human rights, Islamic Law and international human rights law. He is a prolific scholar on the subject matter with books and numerous articles as well as paper presentations all over the world. Also notable is his incredible engagements with human rights related organizations worldwide.
Sections of the following discussion are rephrased from his paper while some others are reproduced and, to a certain extent, quoted verbatim from what he had written.
Mashood begins his 15-page deliberation by underlining the importance of exploring means to ensure a better understanding between fundamentals of religions and human rights principles. One of the reasons he gives is because of the occurrence of countless controversies in the past, now and is going to continue in the future around the globe.
I share his opinion that religion has the potential strength to contribute meaningfully to better acceptance of human rights. But, I also share his disappointment that this has not been fully explored, and religion is still perceived by many as part of the problem in human life, rather than part of the solution.
Mashood treats religion and human rights as very important and interdependent forms of social ordering across the world. Rejecting those who hold that the two should fight for their survival, he opines that both religion and human rights should stay side by side and neither is likely to disappear for the other.
He says that “a positive relationship between the two is necessary for the realisation of universal human rights as well as the humane ideals promoted by all religions”.
Thus he suggests that both the advocates of religious norms and the vanguards of human rights doctrines “must as a matter of necessity promote a harmonious co-existence between the two”.
He further explains that religion has been associated with human existence since time immemorial. It has shaped human behavior and social order in different ways for centuries.
Apparently, religion plays a powerful influence in the individual and collective lives of billions of people either privately or publicly everywhere.
At the same time, he continues, since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, human-rightism has become “a global ideal that cannot be ignored, not only by States but also by individuals and communities all over the world”. Thus, apart from religion, human-rightism as an ideology has also established itself as a parallel and formidable form of social ordering.
This is Mashood’s conclusion for the discussion so far: “There is no doubt that the implementation of human rights norms in most societies today requires thoughtful and well-informed engagement with religion because religious considerations are too important for the majority of people for human rights scholars and advocates to continue to dismiss them simply as irrelevant, insignificant, or problematic”.
“Similarly, human rights are so appealing to a vast majority of religious adherents in today’s world for religious scholars and advocates to dismiss it as simply superfluous”.
Next, Mashood turns to the conceptual understandings of the relationship between religion and human-rightism. It is underpinned by three theoretical perspectives, namely, the separationist, accomodationists and double-edged perspectives. I will only discuss the first two as they well illustrate the positions adopted by the masses.
The Separationist conception is that religion and human-rightism “should tenuously occupy their separate realms of the divine and the secular, respectively”. This perception obviously promotes a rigid secular approach to human-rightism without any intermingling with or interference of religious or moral norms. It is a strict ‘either/or’ approach.
From this perspective, human-rightism is perceived as a strictly secular concept based on a secular humanistic ideology with an emphasis to confer upon individual man a kind of absolute autonomy, freedom and liberty in whatever he/she does or chooses.
Ironically, though freedom of religion is recognized as one of human rights principles under this conception, religion itself is not considered as a source or basis for human rights norms. This conception is mostly predominant in the West.
Mashood cautions Muslims (and non-Muslims as well-I suppose) of one apparent danger of this perception. It is the tendency to represent human-rightism as a ‘complete alternative ideology’ that is in direct confrontation with religion. He warns that this perspective is not healthy to be promoted to, and embraced particularly by, Muslims.
On the other hand, the accomodationist conception “perceives religion as a relevant and important normative factor that can be accommodated for the promotion and protection of human rights, particularly in religious oriented societies or communities”.
This perspective is generally based on a naturalist perception linking its foundations with the concept of natural rights, which was traditionally underpinned by religion.
Its primary argument is that since human-rightism is mainly characterized by the need for humanness, considerations or morality and human dignity, religious fundamentals and teachings can make positive contributions in this regard. Therefore, it has to be normatively accommodated.
This conception provides a means through which religious teachings and human rights principles can be harmonized to operate in synergy.
Unlike the separationist conception, this accomodationist theory does not perceive the relationship between the two as a competition of values. On the contrary, it encourages understanding, constructive engagement and dialogues between the two.
Mashood holds consistently that in Muslim countries, this accomodationist perception represents the best way to encourage a harmonious relationship between Islamic principles and human rights norms.
However, he reminds, the accomodationist conception must not be advocated without acknowledging that there are religious provisions that go against some principles of modern human rights laws in one way or another. If and when this happens, it should be addressed within the context (and teachings) of the respective religions.