On 2 March 2026, the Dewan Rakyat considered at second reading the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, which sought to impose an aggregate maximum of ten years on the tenure of any person as Prime Minister, whether served continuously or otherwise. The Bill failed to secure the constitutionally required majority, falling two votes short of the 148-vote threshold. In the voting session, 146 members voted in favour, 44 abstained and 32 were absent. Under Article 159(3) of the Federal Constitution, a constitutional amendment must generally be supported at both the Second and Third Readings by not less than two-thirds of the total membership of each House of Parliament.
Following the Bill’s defeat, the Cabinet decided on 4 March 2026 to re-table the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026 during the June-August 2026 sitting of the Dewan Rakyat. The proposal has therefore raised an important constitutional question: should Malaysia retain a purely confidence-based system of prime-ministerial tenure, or should it supplement that system with an express time limit?
A term limit refers to the maximum period for which an individual may hold public office. In this context, it is an instrument of institutional design intended to prevent the excessive concentration and personalisation of executive power in a single individual.
Articles 40(2)(a) and 43(2)(a) confer upon the Yang di-Pertuan Agong a constitutionally power and sole discretion to appoint a Prime Minister among the members of the Dewan Rakyat who, in His Majesty’s judgment, is likely to command the confidence of the majority of that House. The office is therefore founded upon continuing parliamentary confidence rather than upon a fixed constitutional term.
The Federal Constitution does not confer upon His Majesty a free-standing power to dismiss a Prime Minister who continues to command the confidence of the Dewan Rakyat. Article 43(4), however, prescribes the consequence where the Prime Minister ceases to command majority confidence and His Majesty withholds consent to a request for dissolution of Parliament, the Prime Minister must tender the resignation of the Cabinet.
A constitutional term limit would not displace the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s appointment function. It would, however, introduce an additional limitation on eligibility and cumulative tenure. His Majesty would continue to appoint, from among constitutionally eligible members of the Dewan Rakyat, the person who most likely to command majority confidence. The amendment would therefore regulate the maximum duration of the office without altering the essential nature of His Majesty’s constitutional discretion.
Under the present framework, a Prime Minister may remain in office for as long as he or she commands majority confidence. The period between 2018 and 2022, when Malaysia had three Prime Ministers within four years amid resignations, shifts in parliamentary confidence and the eventual dissolution of Parliament, illustrates the political volatility that may arise in a confidence-based system. It also underscores the wider need for institutional reform, although the principal rationale for term limits lies in preventing prolonged incumbency and the excessive personalisation of power.
The proposal is not without domestic precedent. Penang became the first Malaysian state formally to impose a two-term limit on the office of Chief Minister. More broadly, fixing the limits on executive tenure are recognised in a number of constitutional systems, although their institutional contexts differ.
Comparative experience is therefore useful, but it should not be overstated. Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea and the United States impose limits upon presidents serving constitutionally fixed terms, while France operates within a semi-presidential framework. Malaysia, by contrast, is a parliamentary democracy in which the Prime Minister remains dependent upon the continuing confidence of the Dewan Rakyat.
In Indonesia, the fall of President Soeharto in 1998, after thirty-two year of rule associated with corruption, collusion and nepotism, led to the amendment of Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution. The two-term limit became an important safeguard against prolonged executive dominance.
The Philippines adopted an even stricter model after the Marcos era. Under the 1987 Constitution, the President may serve only a single six-year term and is thereafter ineligible for re-election, reflecting a strong concern to prevent the re-entrenchment of authoritarian power.
Thailand’s 2017 Constitution imposes an eight-year limit on the office of Prime Minister. The controversy surrounding former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s tenure shows that even numerical limits require careful drafting, particularly on when the period begins and how it is calculated.
South Korea, following its democratic transition in 1987, limited the President to a single five-year term. The United States, through the Twenty-Second Amendment, generally limits a President to two elected terms, while France limits its President to two consecutive five-year terms.
By contrast, the United Kingdom imposes no formal constitutional or statutory term limit on the office of Prime Minister. Margaret Thatcher served for approximately eleven years, while Tony Blair remained in office for ten years. In practice, however, political parties may replace a Prime Minister who becomes an electoral or political liability through internal leadership mechanisms or a vote of no confidence, without waiting for the next general election.
Comparative constitutional practice offers no single model that can be applied universally. Nevertheless, an aggregate two-term (ten-year) limit may serve as an additional safeguard against the prolonged concentration of executive power, while preserving the fundamental principle that a Prime Minister may remain in office only for so long as he or she commands the confidence of the Dewan Rakyat.
Any reform must therefore be carefully drafted, preserve the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s constitutional appointment function, and be supported by meaningful bipartisan deliberation. The central question is whether parliamentary confidence should be reinforced by a term limit in the interests of accountability, institutional renewal and democratic resilience.
